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Abstract
In the recent literature there is growing interest in the morpho-syntactic 
encoding of hierarchical effects. The paper investigates one domain where such 
effects are attested: ergative splits conditioned by person. This type of splits is 
then compared to hierarchical effects in direct-inverse alternations. On the 
basis of two case studies (Lummi instantiating an ergative split person 
language and Passamaquoddy an inverse language) we offer an account that 
makes no use of hierarchies as a primitive. We propose that the two language 
types differ as far as the location of person features is concerned. In inverse 
systems person features are located exclusively in T, while in ergative systems, 
they are located in T and a particular type of v.
2
A consequence of our analysis is that Case checking in split and inverse 
systems is guided by the presence/absence of specific phi-features. This in turn 
provides evidence for a close connection between Case and ĳ-features, 
reminiscent of Chomsky’s (2000, 2001) Agree.
1. Person splits, hierarchies and markedness 
Many ergative languages employ nominative-accusative and absolutive-
ergative markings depending on a) person distinctions (person splits), b) 
tense/aspect/mood of the clause or c) the main/subordinate clause distinction 
(Dixon 1994). In this paper we concentrate on person splits. 
In languages with person splits, sentences with 1
st and 2
nd person arguments 
have a different syntax than sentences with 3
rd person arguments. 1
st and 2
nd
person pronouns exhibit a nominative-accusative pattern, i.e. transitive subjects 
and intransitive arguments bear nominative case/ agreement marking while 
transitive objects bear accusative marking. The nominative-accusative pattern 
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2 Our proposal differs from approaches that link person splits to properties of the T-C system 
and to the mapping hypothesis (Jelinek 1993 and others).  2
is illustrated in (1) and (2) with examples from Dyirbal (from Dixon 1994: 10, 
14) and Lummi (Coast Salish, from Jelinek 1993: 19, 24, 25), respectively: 
(1) a.    n
yurra           nana-na      buran        Dyirbal
            you-all.NOM we all.ACC see-NONFUT                        
            “you all saw us”                                                          
 b.  n
yurra    banaga-n
yu
  you-all.NOM   return-NONFUT 
  “you  all  returned” 
(2) a.  t’Ωm’-t-oƾΩs=sΩn     NOM ACC  Lummi
  hit-TR-1/2  ACC=1.S.NOM 
“I hit you” 
 b.  þey=lΩ’= sΩn
  work=Past=1.S.NOM 
  “I  worked”     
3
rd person arguments (pronouns, NPs) exhibit an absolutive-ergative pattern, 
i.e. transitive subjects bear ergative while transitive objects and intransitive 
arguments bear absolutive:    
(3)     a.   yabu ƾuma-ƾgu buta-n      
  mother.ABS  father.ERG  see-NONFUT 
“The father saw the mother” 
 b.    yabu     banaga-n
yu
  mother.ABS  return.NONFUT 
  “The  mother  returned” 
(4) a.    t’Ωm’-t-s=lΩ=      
  hit-TRANS-3.ERG=PAST=3.ABS 
“He hit him” 
 b.  t’ilΩm’=
  sing=3.ABS 
  “He  sang” 
Splits of the type illustrated in (1)-(4) have been described in the 
typological literature as phenomena of case markedness on the core referents
of the NPs in the A (subject of transitive verb) and O (object of transitive verb) 
grammatical functions. Nominative is taken to be the unmarked case of the 
nominative-accusative system and absolutive the unmarked case of the 
ergative-absolutive system. Being unmarked, nominative and absolutive 
surface on the single argument of intransitives, and they are often null or 
associated with less morphology than accusative and ergative. In languages 
with person splits 1
st and 2
nd person pronouns surface with unmarked 3
nominative and 3
rd person arguments with marked ergative when they occur in 
the A function. 1
st and 2
nd person pronouns surface with marked accusative and 
3
rd person arguments with unmarked absolutive when they occur in the O 
function. This sensitivity of case-distribution (marked vs. unmarked) to the 
grammatical function (A vs. O) of particular argument types (1
st, 2
nd vs. 3
rd)
has been explained in terms of the nominal hierarchy in (5) (Silverstein 1976) 
in combination with the view that marked case is associated with marked 
grammatical function (see e.g. Silverstein 1976; Kuno 1976; Dixon 1994: 85). 
(5)      Common  Nouns 
1
st person 
pronouns 
2
nd person 
pronouns 
3
rd person 
pronouns, 
demonstratives 
Proper 
Names 
Human Anima
te
Inanima
te
It is proposed that the elements in the left-hand side of (5) are more likely to 
appear in the A function as they are prototypical agents, i.e. “natural instigators 
of actions”.  The ones on the right-hand side of (5) are more likely to appear in 
the O function as they prototypical patients, i.e. “natural” undergoers. 1
st and 
2
nd (local) person arguments display an accusative pattern and 3
rd person (non-
local) arguments an ergative pattern because unmarked cases (nominative for 
A and absolutive for O) appear on prototypical agents/ patients (local subjects, 
non-local objects), while marked cases (ergative for A and accusative for O) 
appear on non-prototypical agents/ patients (non-local subjects, local objects). 
This account is summarized in table I (from Aissen 1999: 675): 
  Table I: Person Splits in Ergative Languages 
 Unmarked  Marked 
Local Persons  Subject  Object 
3
rd Person  Object  Subject  
Case  Nominative/ Absolutive   Accusative / Ergative 
Building on Silverstein (1976), a number of researchers (DeLancey 
1981, Legendre & al. 1993, Aissen 1999) have argued that person splits should 
be analysed in terms of the requirement, expressed in (6), for harmonic 
alignment of prominence scales, as in (7), which are considered to be part of 
the universal grammar. 
(6)  Universal person scales, role scales, relational scales must be brought 
into alignment  
(7) Person  Scale 
a. Local person > Pronoun 3
rd  > Proper noun 3
rd  > Human 3
rd  > 
Animate 3
rd  > Inanimate 3
rd4
Role Scale 
b. Agent > Patient 
Relational Scale 
c. Subject > Non-subject        (Aissen 1999: 679) 
Harmonic alignment associates the high-ranking elements as well as the low-
ranking elements on the three scales. According to (6), the maximally 
unmarked clause is one in which the agent subject is a local (1
st, 2
nd person) 
argument and the patient object is a non-local (3
rd person) argument. The 
maximally marked clause is one in which the agent subject is a non-local (3
rd
person) argument while the patient object is a local (1
st, 2
nd person) argument.  
Person splits have been linked to a number of other phenomena that can 
be understood in terms of (morphological and syntactic) markedness reflecting 
alignment of scales of the type illustrated in (7). The alternation between the 
direct and inverse voice instantiates one such phenomenon. Consider 
Passamaquoddy, a language showing the direct/ inverse alternation (Bruening 
2001). In Passamaquoddy, transitive verbs are formed with finals that reflect 
the animacy of the object. There are TA (Transitive Animate) verbs that take 
animate objects, and TI (Transitive Inanimate) verbs that take inanimate 
objects. All animate nouns qualify as either proximate or obviative, depending 
on several (discourse and grammatical) factors. TA verbs have a prefix that 
always marks the proximate argument (italicized in (8)). A plural suffix 
(italicized in (8)) also marks this argument. The other argument is marked by a 
suffix in final position (underlined in (8)). If the subject is the proximate 
argument, the verb is direct (marked by a), as in (8a). If the object is the 
proximate argument, the verb is inverse (marked by ku), as in (8b). First and 
second persons are always proximate with respect to third persons: 
(8) a.  k-ciksotuw-a-nnu-k     Direct 
  2-listen  to  TA-DIR-1P-3P 
    “we (Incl) listen to them” 
 b.  k-ciksota-ku-nnu-k     Inverse 
  2-listen  to  TA-INV-1P-3P 
    “they listen to us (Incl)” 
Accounts that treat the alternation in (8) in terms of syntactic markedness 
crucially assume that the direct is the unmarked and the inverse the marked 
member of the direct/ inverse opposition. In (8a) the unmarked direct is chosen 
because the subject is local and the object non-local, a configuration reflecting 
harmonic alignment of the person and the relational scales in (7). Choice of the 
marked inverse in (8b) signals the maximally marked configuration with a non-
local 3
rd person subject and a local 2
nd person object.         5
  Markedness relations have also been argued to derive the active/passive 
voice opposition in another set of languages. As will be discussed in section 4 
below, Lummi has no (unmarked) transitive sentence corresponding to a string 
like (9a) where a non-local agent acts upon a local patient. Only the (marked) 
passive is possible in such cases, as in (9b): 
(9)  a.  *       ERG ACC  “He knows me”   
 b.  xþi-t-ƾ=sΩn   NOM   “I  am  known  (by 
someone)”    
A final phenomenon that has been treated along similar lines is 
illustrated in (10): 
(10) a.    Tha su ton stilune
       Fut Cl(Gen, 2nd, sg) Cl(Acc, 3rd, sg, masc) send-3pl 
       “They will send him to you” 
b. *Tha tu se stilune
       Fut Cl(Gen, 3rd, sg, masc) Cl(Acc, 2nd, sg) send-3pl 
     “They will send you to him” 
The phenomenon in (10) is known in the literature as the *me lui/I-II 
Constraint,  or Person-Case Constraint  (henceforth the PCC; see Perlmutter 
1971, Kayne 1975, Bonet 1991, 1994, Ormazabal & Romero 2001, 
Haspelmath 2001, Anagnostopoulou 2003, 2005; Bianchi 2003 among others). 
The PCC restricts combinations of dative and accusative phonologically weak 
elements (clitics, agreement markers, weak pronouns). One formulation of the 
PCC is given in (11) ((11) is the, so called, Weak version of the PCC assumed 
to be the core case of the PCC by Haspelmath 2001, Bianchi 2003 and others; 
see Bonet 1991 and Anagnostopoulou 2005 for discussion of the two versions 
of the PCC): 
(11)  In a combination of a weak direct object and an indirect object [clitic, 
  agreementmarker or weak pronoun], if there is a third person it has to 
  be the direct object.  (Bonet 1991: 182) 
(11) prevents 1
st and 2
nd person weak direct objects from co-occurring with 3
rd
person weak indirect objects, capturing the fact that (10a), with a local indirect 
object and a non-local direct object, is grammatical, while (10b), with a non-
local indirect object and a local direct-object, is ungrammatical. As discussed 
in Haspelmath (2001), among others, the effects of the PCC in (10), under the 6
formulation in (11),
3 can be straightforwardly accommodated in terms of 
alignment of scales, if goal/ benefactors are taken to outrank patient themes in 
the Role Scale and indirect objects outrank direct objects in the Relational 
Scale, as in (12):  
(12) Person  Scale 
a. Local person > Pronoun 3
rd  > Proper noun 3
rd  > Human 3
rd  > 
Animate 3
rd  > Inanimate 3
rd
Role Scale 
b. Agent > Goal> Patient 
Relational Scale 
c. Subject > Indirect Object > Direct Object 
The requirement for alignment of grammatical function prominence and 
person/ animacy prominence has as a consequence that the direct object cannot 
be ranked higher than the indirect object in the person/animacy scale, 
explaining the ungrammaticality of (10b). 
  At first sight, the above mentioned accounts might seem attractive as 
they treat a number of different phenomena as reflexes of a single 
generalization, association of semantic role with person/ animacy rank. They 
raise, however, questions having to do with the status of Silverstein’s nominal 
hierarchy and the way in which markedness generalizations can be expressed 
in a formal theory of grammar.   
More specifically, as pointed out by Jelinek (1993: 18), the most 
obvious difficulty with Silverstein’s scale is that contrary to the claim that 1
st
and 2
nd person arguments are “more natural” agents than 3
rd person arguments, 
the referents of 3
rd person arguments are statistically as likely to be agents as 1
st
and 2
nd person arguments, a fact confirmed by text counts by Wierzbicka 
(1981). Moreover, much research in the Principles and Parameters framework 
has shown that hierarchies, such as the theta-hierarchy – even though 
descriptively useful – are not primitive but can be derived from independently 
motivated interacting principles. A further set of questions concerns 
markedness, and in particular the way in which statements about markedness 
can be encoded in the theory of morpho-syntax. Should the formal theory of 
Case include statements about case markedness? Is unmarked case a 
morphological or syntactic notion? In what sense is the passive more marked 
than the active and the inverse more marked than the direct? Is it correct to 
unify the different expressions of markedness and to treat case markedness on a 
par with voice markedness? A final consideration is that it is not at all evident 
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that all the phenomena mentioned above (person splits, direct-inverse, active-
passive, the PCC) should be reduced to exactly the same principles.  
Recent work on the PCC (Ormazabal & Romero 2001; 
Anagnostopoulou 2003, 2005; Adger and Harbour 2003; Bejar and Rezac 
2003, Bianchi 2003) has shown that the constraint can be successfully analyzed 
in terms of agreement checking procedures. Person/ animacy and case scales 
turn out to be epiphenomenal  the effects of which can be derived from 
independent components of the grammar. The present paper continues this line 
of research focusing in particular on person splits. Our goal is to explore the 
extent to which effects which have been described in terms of hierarchies can 
be successfully analyzed in terms of familiar agreement and Case checking in a 
number of well-defined syntactic environments. We argue for an analysis of 
person splits based on a particular view of ergativity and feature checking. We 
then compare hierarchical effects in person splits to hierarchical effects in 
direct-inverse alternations, pointing to the similarities and differences between 
the two types of phenomena. We conclude that it is incorrect to unify split 
ergativity, direct-inverse alternations and PCC effects under a single 
explanation. The three phenomena arise under different syntactic conditions. 
   In the next section  we present our core assumptions on ergativity. In 
section 3 we turn to a detailed study of Lummi. In section 4 we examine 
inverse systems. In section 5 we offer our general conclusions. 
2. Ergativity: core assumptions 
The literature on ergativity contains several attempts to reconcile the well 
known Case and Agreement patterns of ergative languages with a constrained 
theory of Universal Grammar. Bobaljik (1993) and Laka (1993) argue that 
absolutive case is low case, the counterpart of accusative. Ergative is seen as a 
'high' case, the counterpart of nominative. On this view, the parameter 
differentiating ergative from accusative languages manifests itself in the 
intransitive clause and has to do with the case that is active in intransitives: 
high nominative takes precedence over accusative in accusative languages; low 
absolutive takes precedence over ergative in ergative languages. On the other 
hand, many analyses within the Principles and Parameters theory equate 
absolutive case to the nominative of the nominative-accusative languages 
(Bok-Bennema 1991; Nash 1995, 1996; Woolford 1997). The ergative case is 
analyzed as a by-phrase (Hale 1970), a PP or a KP (Bittner 1994), a genitive 
NP (Bok-Bennema 1991) or an abstract equivalent of the accusative (Murasugi 8
1992).
4 Mahajan (1993), Nash (1996) and Woolford (1997) argue that ergative 
is not a structural case parallel to nominative, but rather a lexical case parallel 
to dative. 
In this paper we will adopt the view that ergative is what Marantz 
(1991) calls dependent case similar to accusative. Marantz argues that there is 
an important similarity between ergative and accusative case: both are what he 
calls “dependent cases”. Dependent case is assigned when a distinct position is 
(i) not part of a chain having lexical case and (ii) distinct from the chain being 
assigned dependent case. Marantz proposes that ergative is dependent case 
assigned “upwards” to the subject, while accusative is dependent case assigned 
“downwards” to the object. On Marantz's theory, it is the definition of 
dependent case that explains the data covered by Burzio's generalization 
(accusative case on the object is assigned only when a subject is present) as 
well as the generalization that ergative case is assigned only when an object is 
present. This view will be re-stated within the v system. 
  We will place our analysis in a system without agreement projections 
following Chomsky (1995, 2000, 2001). Following Alexiadou (2001),
5 we 
propose that ergativity/ accusativity is tied to the properties of a semi-
functional head v introducing the external argument and checking Case of the 
internal argument (Kratzer 1994, Chomsky 1995). In the literature, see e.g 
Collins (1997) and Marantz (1997), it has been argued that there are two main 
types of v: transitive vs. intransitive. The former combines with the external 
argument, the latter does not: 
(13)  a.  transitive v [+external argument] v-TR 
  b.  intransitive v [-external argument] v-INTR 
Extending this distinction we will assume that there are several types of 
intransitive (Embick 1998, Alexiadou 2001) and transitive vs available to the 
computational system (Harley & Noyer 1998, Arad 1999).  
In the transitive clause of nominative-accusative languages, the object 
checks Case and phi-features against v-TR and the subject checks Case and 
phi-features against T. Passives and unaccusatives contain a deficient v-INTR 
which cannot check the Case of the object. As a result, the object enters 
Agree/Move with T, resulting in Nominative Case and Subject Agreement.  
Following a recent trend in the literature (see e.g. Bobaljik & Branigan, 
to appear) we assume that ergativity is not a uniform phenomenon. We propose 
that certain types of ergative languages include a v that does not enter Agree 
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with the object (cf. Müller 2004). In these languages, the object checks 
absolutive case under Agree with T (with or without movement). Ergative is a 
case on the subject assigned by v. We will call this type of v, v-ERG. Thus the 
“dependent case” generalizations state above can be stated as properties of v-
TR and what we called here v-ERG. Specifically, v-ERG checks Case on the 
subject only when an object is present , while v-TR enters Agree with the 
object only when a subject is present. The “dependent case” statements are, in 
turn, reducible to a requirement of T to always enter Agree. In clauses 
containing a single argument, this must enter Agree with T, yielding 
Nominative or Absolutive, which, therefore, take precedence over Accusative 
and Ergative. The treatment of ergative as dependent case is consistent with a 
view of ergative as structural rather than lexical Case.  
3. The Syntax of Splits: Case distinctions reflect different types of vs 
On the basis of Lummi, we argue that person splits result from choices of 
particular Voice heads: (i) ergative vs. accusative v. In particular, Ergative v 
reflects the lack of person features (3). On the other hand, accusative v reflects 
the presence of person features (1,2). 
To begin with, there is clear morphological evidence that ergative 
arguments are realized in a low position in Lummi (Jelinek 1993: 19-23), 
supporting the view that ERG is assigned to the subject in its base position, 
adopted in this paper. Lummi has a second position clitic sequence marking 
Mood, Tense, Modality and the Nominative Subject. These unstressed clitics 
follow the first word in the sentence, the predicate. The predicate contains a 
root, derivational suffixes and internal arguments. These arguments are 
morphologically internal; they are suffixes preceding the clitic string. The 
clitics are unstressed while the internal argument suffixes are integrated into 
the predicate and may receive the sentence stress. In transitive predicates the 
root is obligatorily followed by transitivizing suffixes which mark the valence 
of the predicates. Sentences with a local object and a local subject have a 
nominative-accusative syntax. The accusative suffix ACC is associated with 
the TR head which immediately precedes ACC. The subject is the rightmost 
element in the clitic cluster: 
(14) leƾ-t-óƾΩȜ   =lΩ’   =sx
w
 see-TR-1.P.ACC  =PAST =2.S.NOM 
  “You saw us” 
Following and modifying Murasugi (1992) and Jelinek (1993), we assume that 
the TR suffix is a realization of v-TR. The structure we assume for (14) is 
given in (15) (compare to tree (23) in Jelinek 1993: 23): 10
(15)         TP    
3
  T       vP 
= lԥ’= sx
w
i 3
           Agenti          v’ 
3
      v-TR        RootP 
  l e ƾj-t-óƾԥȜk 3
                Rootj      Patientk
The 1.P.ACC morpheme “óƾԥȜ” on the predicate cluster in v-TR spells out 
Agree between v-TR and the object while the 2.S.NOM morpheme sx
w on the 
clitic cluster in T spells out Agree between T and the subject.
6 Crucially, 
ergative morphemes in Lummi occur in the same place as accusative 
morphemes. As shown in (16), the 3
rd person ergative marking s occurs internal 
to the predicate, right next to the TR head, just like the accusative “óƾԥȜ” in 
(14) (Jelinek 1993: 25-26): 
(16) q’woy-t-s =lԥ’   =
 die-TR-3ERG  =PAST =3ABS 
  “He killed him” 
The ergative suffix precedes the tense clitic in (16) while the nominative clitic 
follows the tense clitic in (14). We propose that the string in (16) has the syntax 
in (17): 
(17)         TP    
3
  T       vP 
= lԥ’=k 3
           Agenti          v’ 
3
      v-ERG        RootP 
  q ’ w o y  j-t-si 3
                Rootj      Patientk
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The ERG morpheme on the predicate cluster in v-ERG spells out Agree 
between v-ERG and the subject, while the zero absolutive morpheme on T 
spells out Agree between T and the object. In Lummi, absolutive arguments are 
phonologically null. All other arguments are overt.  
  The presence of an ergative agent in spec, vP in (17) does not block 
Agree between T and the lower absolutive patient, i.e. the agent does not cause 
what Chomsky (2000; 2001) calls “a defective intervention effect”. This is not 
surprising, however. As stressed by Bobaljik (2004), defective intervention 
effects are never caused in monoclausal environments. Thus, while in Icelandic 
biclausal sentences (cf. 18a,b from Schütze 1997 and Holmberg and 
Hróarsdóttir 2002) the intervening dative blocks Agree between matrix T and 
the embedded nominative, in monoclausal contexts (cf. 19, taken from 
Bobaljik 2004) the dative does not block Agree between T and the nominative 
object: 
(18) a. Mér           fannst/*fundust  henni       leiðast          þeir    
      Me-DAT  seem-3sg/*3pl    she-DAT to-be bored  they-NOM 
      “I thought she was bored with them” 
   b. Það  virðist/ *virðast  einhverjum manni [hestarnir       vera seinir]
      there seems-sg/seem-pl some man-DAT the horses-NOM be   slow 
      “It seems to some man that the horses are slow” 
(19) a.  Það  líkuðu   einhverjum   þessir  sokkar
    there  liked-PL  someone-DAT  these  socks-NOM 
        “Someone liked these socks” 
     b.  Um veturinn  voru    konunginum  gefnar ambáttir
      In the winter  were-PL  the king-DAT given  slaves-NOM 
      “In the winter the king was given (female) slaves” 
It is beyond the scope of the present paper to explain the presence vs. absence 
of the intervention effect in (18) vs. (19). What matters for present purposes is 
the fact that the nominative object enters Agree with T across an intervening 
dative experiencer in (19a) and goal in (19b). In a similar manner, the 
absolutive object enters Agree with T across an intervening ergative agent in 
(16), (17). 
7
In (15) and (17) above we have seen the derivations for the patterns that 
involve 1-2 person (see ex. (14)) and third-third person (see example (16)) 
subject-object combinations respectively. In the system we are assuming the 
difference between (14) and (16) is expressed through the presence of different 
types of vs: in particular two such vs are taken to present, an accusative v that 
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leads to a pattern where the object bears accusative and the subject nominative, 
and an ergative v that leads to a pattern in which the object bears absolutive 
and the subject ergative. 
Now consider how this system enables us to account for the attested 
and non-attested patterns in Lummi (20): 
(20)  a. NOM ACC xýi-t-ońǨs=sǨn 'I know you'   1,2 >1,2 
  b. ERG ABS   xýi-t-s=0             'He knows him'  3>3 
    c. *ERG ACC                        '*He knows me'          *3>1,2 
d. NOM ABS  xýi-t-0=sǨn          'I know him'    1>3 
We have seen that (20a) has the syntax in (15), while (20b) has the 
syntax of (17). The NOM ACC pattern relies on the presence of v-TR, which 
yields the syntax that appears throughout in nominative-accusative languages. 
The ERG ABS pattern relies on the presence of v-ERG, which yields the 
ergative-absolutive clause. The interesting cases to explain are the 
ungrammatical (20c) and the grammatical (20d) which mix a case from the 
ergative system with a case from the accusative system.  
Starting from the well-formed (20d), where NOM co-occurs with ABS, 
we propose that this is an instance of a multiple Move/ Agree construction (Ura 
1996, Richards 1997, Anagnostopoulou 2003), in which both arguments enter 
Agree with T, checking their features on T. Following Richards (1997) and 
Anagnostopoulou (2003), we propose that when two arguments enter 
Move/Agree with a higher head the order of operations must respect the 
Minimal Link Condition. The higher argument Moves first, followed by Move 
or just Agree of the lower argument. When the lower argument  moves, it tucks 
in beneath the first one. The derivation proceeds as shown in (21). First the 
DP1 moves to T because it is closer to it, and sub-sequently the DP2 moves to 
T. Movement of DP.2 across the trace of DP1 is licit because traces do not 
count as interveners (Chomsky 1995; 2000; 2001). 
(21) Base:         TP 
  3
          T              vP         
3      
            DP1        v’ 
    3
               v .......           VP 
     6
                  DP2 13
Step I:  Movement of High Argument 
          TP 
   3
DP1 T’
 3
T        vP 
3
                    e                   v’ 
             3
                      v     .......   VP 
           6
                                                DP2 
Step II: Movement of Low Argument 
TP
  3
DP1             TP 
     3
        DP2                   T’ 
               3
              T                   vP 
3
                e               v’ 
                3
               v        .......    VP 
                 6
             e
When the lower argument (DP2) does not move, it enters Agree with T 
after DP1 has moved to T because Agree across an A-movement trace is 
possible (see Holmberg and Hróarsdóttir 2002 for evidence from Icelandic).
We propose that (20d) has either an analysis as in (21) or an analysis 
where the NOM moves to T and then the ABS enters Agree with T.
8 Under 
either analysis both arguments, subject and object, enter Agree with T. In 
recent research on the PCC (Anagnostopoulou 1999; 2003, 2005; Bobaljik & 
Branigan to appear; Bejar and Rezac 2003) it has been argued that two 
arguments are allowed to check features against a functional head, v-TR or T, 
provided that certain conditions are met. The core observation is that when two 
arguments check features against a single functional head either  (22) or (23) 
must hold:    
(22)  Strong Condition on Multiple Feature Checking 
When two arguments check features against a single functional head, 
the lower one must be third person 
(23) Weak Condition on Multiple Feature Checking
When two arguments check features against a single functional head, if 
there is a third person it has to be the lower argument. 
Conditions (22) and (23) subsume the Strong and the Weak version of 
the PCC discussed in Bonet (1991; 1994), Bianchi (2003) and 
                                                           
8 The nominative argument must be assumed to move to T, regardless of whether the 
absolutive argument is taken to Move to T or just to enter Agree with T (see also footnotes 6 
and 7 for discussion of the issue of Move and Agree). 14
Anagnostopoulou (2005) (see section 2 above for an explicit formulation of the 
Weak Version of the PCC). According to (22), when two arguments enter 
feature checking against the same head the lower argument is not allowed to be 
1
st or 2
nd person, regardless of the person specification of the higher argument, 
i.e. whether it is 1
st , 2
nd , or 3
rd. According to (23), what is not allowed is for 
the lower argument to outrank the higher one in person. 1
st and 2
nd person low 
arguments are licit in the presence of 1
st and 2
nd person high arguments and 
illicit in the presence of 3
rd person high arguments. Which Constraint is active 
in a particular language, i.e. whether a language has (22) or (23), appears to be 
a parameter (see Anagnostopoulou 2005, for extensive discussion). In the 
literature several proposals have been developed to derive Conditions (22) and 
(23).
NOM>ABS sequences like (20d) in Lummi are compatible with both 
the Strong Condition in (22) and the Weak Condition in (23). The language is 
such that in NOM>ABS configurations the NOM argument is always 1
st or 2
nd
person and the ABS argument always 3
rd. Recall that when both the subject and 
the object are equally ranked in person, i.e. when they are both 1
st and 2
nd
person, then they check features against distinct heads, T the subject and v-TR 
the object, bleeding the Multiple Feature Checking Configuration  
For the purposes of the present discussion we will assume that the 
Strong Condition (22) holds in Lummi. Following Anagnostopoulou (2003; 
2005) we propose that in Multiple Feature Checking configurations the 
derivation proceeds as detailed above. In such configurations phi-features are 
not checked as a bundle. The argument that moves first to a functional head F 
checks person on F and the argument that moves/ agrees second may only 
check number on F, as depicted in (24) for the Multiple Move construction: 
(24) Base:         FP 
  3
          F{P,N}        XP     (P  =  person features 
3     N  =  number  features)
          DP1            X’ 
    3
               X .......ZP 
     6
                    DP2 15
Step I:  Checking of person feature by 
high argument          
          FP 
   3
DP1          F’ 
 3
F{0,N}         XP 
3
                    e               X’ 
             3
                      X     .......ZP 
           6
                                                  DP2 
Step II: Checking of number by low argument 
FP
  3
DP1           FP 
     3
         DP2               F’ 
               3
         F{0,0}             XP 
3
                e               X’ 
                3
               X        .......ZP 
                 6
             e
If the lower argument is of an appropriate type (third person) the 
derivation converges. If, however, the lower argument is inappropriate (1
st,
2
ndperson) the derivation crashes. On the assumption that 3
rd person arguments 
lack a person feature (they are no person; Benveniste 1966, Postal 1966, 
Silverstein 1986, Bonet 1991, Johns 1993, Taraldsen 1995, Ritter 1995 and 
Kayne 2000 among many others), they are the only ones that can match the 
number feature of F, once person on F has been checked.  
Before closing the discussion of (20d), there is a final question we need 
to address. Why is it that 3
rd person objects in Lummi must check features 
against T, i.e. why is it that they are not allowed to check features against v-TR 
which would lead to a surface ACC form? We propose that presence vs. 
absence of person features is exactly what differentiates the two types of v of 
Lummi, v-TR vs. v-ERG. The presence of an ACC Case feature on v matches 
objects specified as [+person].
9 The presence of an ERG Case feature on v 
matches subjects that lack person. 
Turning, finally, to the ungrammatical ERG>ACC combinations in 
(20c), there are at least three ways to account for them. One possibility is to 
resort to the definition of ERG and ACC as dependent Cases. Assuming, as in 
section 3, that the “dependent case” statements are reducible to a requirement 
of T to always enter Agree, ERG>ACC combinations are ruled out because 
there is no argument that can enter Agree with T. Another option is to assume 
that v-ERG is basically an intransitive v (cf. Jelinek 1993; Alexiadou 2001). 
(24c) is, on this view, ruled out because an intransitive v introducing the 
                                                           
9 Person split languages provide evidence that case checking is linked to person checking as 
claimed on purely theoretical grounds in Chomsky (2000, 2001). 16
ergative subject cannot check accusative Case on the object. A final possibility 
is that ERG>ACC combinations are ruled out because they violate the 
Conditions on Multiple feature checking (22) and (23) discussed above. 
ERG>ACC combinations would represent instances where a 3
rd person subject 
and a 1
st or 2
nd person object check features against the same head, an 
inappropriate configuration, for the reasons outlined above.
10
  To summarize, thus far we have argued that: 
(i) The person split in Lummi is linked to choice of two different vs. 
(ii) The presence vs. absence of person features guides choice of v-TR vs. v-
ERG
  In the next section we turn to inverse systems. 
4. Inverse Systems
We now turn to Passamaquoddy, where, as will be seen in this section, 
hierarchical effects result from the interaction of the following factors:  
(i) Person features are hosted on only one head in the clause, namely T.  
(ii) In the transitive clause, a [+Proximate] feature on T must be checked.  
(iii) [+Person] arguments are always [+Proximate] and must check their 
features against T.  
(iv) 3
rd person animate arguments check features against T in order to satisfy 
the requirement of T in the transitive clause to enter Agree with a [+proximate] 
NP (see condition (ii) above).  
Recall from section 2 the main characteristics of Passamaquoddy. In 
Passamaquoddy, transitive verbs are formed with finals that reflect the animacy 
of the object. Transitive Animate verbs take animate objects, and Transitive 
Inanimate verbs take inanimate objects. Animate nouns qualify as either 
proximate or obviative. Transitive animate verbs have a prefix and a suffix 
(italicized in (25)) that mark the proximate argument and a suffix in final 
position (underlined in (25)) for the other argument. If the subject is proximate, 
the verb is direct, as in (25a). If the object is proximate, the verb is inverse, as 
                                                           
10 Note however that in Halkomelem Salish ERG>ACC is not always ruled out. It is also not 
ruled out in Dyirbal (language with Case marking not Agreement Marking). The fact that 
ERG>ACC is possible in Dyirbal is expected in a theory that treats the ungrammaticality of 
ERG>ACC combinations as a subcase of the PCC constraint, because the PCC restricts 
combinations of agreement markers and clitics and does not obtain with strong pronouns (see 
Bonet 1991, 1994 and many others for discussion). In Halkomelem Salish the ERG>ACC 
constraint could be morphological in nature. As Wiltschko (2003) notes, certain ERG>ACC 
combinations are possible when a portmanteau morpheme is available for them.  As discussed 
by Anagnostopoulou (2003), Haspelmath (2001), Ormazabal and Romero (2001) and others, 
the PCC is not a universal, contra Bonet (1994). 17
in (25b). First and second persons are always proximate with respect to third 
persons: 
(25) a.  k-ciksotuw-a-nnu-k     Direct 
  2-listen  to  TA-DIR-1P-3P 
    “we (Incl) listen to them” 
 b.  k-ciksota-ku-nnu-k     Inverse 
  2-listen  to  TA-INV-1P-3P 
    “they listen to us (Incl)” 
Drawing on evidence from binding, Bruening (2001) argues 
convincingly that inversion is A-movement of the object across the subject to a 
higher head H, which proceeds via a secondary specifier to v-TR, the head that 
introduces the subject. As argued extensively in Ura (1996), Richards (1997) 
and Anagnostopoulou (2003), non-local A-movement always proceeds 
successive cyclically through the specifier of a higher head introducing the 
intervener. We will therefore adopt the essentials of Bruening’s analysis and 
we will assume that the target H of inversion is T. Inverse languages thus have 
two types of v-Tr (see Ura 1996): (i) (Direct) v-Tr does not license a secondary 
specifier that can host the object on its way to T; therefore, only the subject is 
allowed to move to T in the Direct Voice. (ii) (Inverse) v-Tr licenses a 
secondary specifier through which the object moves to T across the subject. 
In intransitives, 1
st and 2
nd person arguments agree on the verb in 
intransitives as subjects of transitives ((26a), (26b)), but third persons agree on 
the verb like objects (27):    
(26) a.  nt-op
  1-sit 
  “I  sit” 
b. kt-op
  “2-sit” 
(27)   opu-wok (cf. n-tokom-a-k)
sit-3P          1-hit-Dir-3P 
    “they sit”        “I hit them” 
At first sight, this could be seen as a person split of the type found in Lummi. 
1
st and 2
nd person arguments could be seen as having NOM in (26), while 3
rd
person arguments could be seen as having ABS in (27). However, a closer look 
into Passamaquoddy shows that this is not the right way of looking at things. 
Crucially, 1
st and 2
nd  person subjects and objects in transitives show a different 
agreement pattern than the one illustrated in (25). As pointed out by Bruening, 
they behave as if they are competing for the same agreement slot: the slot they 
would occupy if their co-argument were a third person. The principle that 18
decides the conflict is that the second person prefix always over-rules the first 
person prefix. Suffixes display the opposite preference: if there is a first person 
plural it is marked. Otherwise, a second person plural is marked. Which is the 
subject and which the object is marked by a sign: first person subject, second 
person object is marked by l; second person subject, first person object is 
marked by i:
(28) a.  k-ciksotuw-i-pon
  2-listen  to  TA-2/1-1P 
    “you(Sg/P) listen to us (Excl)” 
 b.  k-ciksotu-l-pon
  2-listen  to  TA-1/2-1P 
    “we listen to you (Sg/P)” 
The fact that 1
st and 2
nd person subjects and objects both occupy the subject 
agreement slot in (28) suggests that they both check features against the same 
head, namely T. In contrast, we have seen that in Lummi 1
st and 2
nd person 
arguments check their features against two different heads, T and v-TR.   
To account for the facts in (25)-(28), Bruening proposes that there is a 
syntactic uninterpretable feature in Passamaquoddy Proximate [P] which is a 
feature on NPs. When this feature has a positive specification [+P] it must be 
checked against T. First and second person pronouns are always [+P], and must 
check their features against T. Inanimates cannot be [+P]. Animate third person 
arguments have unvalued [P]. When two animate NPs co-occur in a single 
clause, one of them is assigned [+P]. If the subject is [+P], it enters Agree with 
T. If the object is [+P] it has to move to T through a layered specifier to 
(inverse) v-Tr. The other argument receives an unvalued [P] feature which is 
checked against v, and is then assigned another feature [Obv] which is spelled 
out as the obviative suffix in the morphology.  
Obligatory assignment of a [Proximate] feature to one third person 
animate DP in a transitive clause lacking another 1
st or 2
nd person argument can 
be shown to be linked to a requirement of T in the transitive clause to check a 
[+P] feature, unlike T in intransitives which may or may not enter Agree with a 
[Proximate] feature.  
Recall from (27) that there is never a prefix for third person arguments 
in intransitives, suggesting that only 1
st and 2
nd person arguments, which are 
inherently specified as [+Person], check their features against T in the 
intransitive clause. 3
rd person arguments do not enter Agree with T but with v-
INTR. Syntactically they behave as obviative, even though they surface with 
unmarked (i.e. proximate) case morphology. In contrast, T in transitives must 
enter Agree. For this reason, when 1
st and 2
nd person arguments are not present 
in the clause, a 3
rd person animate argument that is considered central is singled 
out as proximate; all other third persons are obviative. When the proximate 19
argument is the subject, as in (29) below (Bruening 2001: 38), the Direct Voice 
is employed:   
(29) Mali ´-kis-ewestuwam-a-l    peskuw-ol  pomawsuwinuw-ol
 Mary  3-Perf-talk  to-Dir-3   one-Obv  person-Obv 
  “Mary (Prox) spoke to one person (Obv)” 
When the proximate argument is the object, the Inverse Voice is employed. 
Crucially, it is absolutely impossible for two inanimates to co-occur as subject 
and object in Passamaquoddy (see Bruening 2001: 127 who shows that there is 
no such restriction against inanimate arguments in intransitives), a restriction 
that follows from the requirement that T must enter Agree in transitives. Since 
inanimate arguments cannot be assigned a [Proximate] feature, the requirement 
of T to enter Agree is not satisfied, and the derivation crashes.
11
  The Proximate feature of Passamaquoddy can be seen as a dependent 
Case feature, the counterpart of ACC in nominative-accusative languages and 
ERG in ergative-absolutive languages, as discussed in the previous section. 
Just as ACC and ERG, PROX is assigned in opposition to another argument in 
the clause, and is therefore present only in transitives. Unlike ACC and ERG, 
though, PROX is not checked against v. Rather, it is checked against T. The 
above considerations lead to the following distribution of dependent Case 
features: 
(30) Ditsribution of Dependent Cases: ACC, ERG, PROX 
Downwards: ACC. In Intransitives NOM is assigned because Intransitive T 
needs to enter Agree. NOM is compatible with 1
st 2
nd and 3
rd person animate 
and inanimate (i.e. no person). 
Upwards: ERG. In Intransitives ABS is assigned because Intransitive T needs 
to enter Agree. ABS is compatible with 1
st 2
nd and 3
rd person animate and 
inanimate (i.e. no person). 
Both directions: PROX. In Intransitives PROX is not assigned because 
Intransitive T does not need to enter Agree. PROX is compatible with 1
st 2
nd
and 3
rd person animate, therefore two animates cannot co-occur in transitives. 
                                                           
11 The asymmetry between transitive and intransitive T in Passamaquoddy 
(intransitive T does not have to enter Agree, transitive T has to enter Agree) is reminiscent of a 
Generalization extensively discussed in Alexiadou & Anagnostopoulou (2001), namely The 
Subject In-situ Generalization (SSG), formulated in (i) (compare (i) to the original formulation 
of the SSG in Alexiadou and Anagnostopoulou 2001: 193): 
(i)  The vP can contain no more than one argument with structural Case 
Just as in the cases falling under SSG one argument in transitive clauses, the subject or the 
object must vacate the vP, in Passamaquoddy transitive clauses, one argument, the subject or 
the object must enter Agree with T. 20
The discussion of person splits in Salish has led us to propose that ACC 
in Lummi matches 1
st and 2
nd person, supporting the connection between Case 
and agreement checking suggested in Chomsky (2000, 2001). The same link 
between Case and phi-features can be established on the basis of assignment of 
PROX in Passamaquoddy, if PROX is seen as a Case feature. More 
specifically, suppose that the syntactic uninterpretable feature Proximate [P] 
has an interpretable feature as a correlate, namely Person. As will be seen, this 
quite naturally accounts for the characterization of certain NPs as necessarily 
proximate and of other NPs as necessarily obviative.  
A number of researchers have argued on the basis of PCC effects (see 
sections 2 and 4) that indirect objects behave as if they have a person feature, 
even when they are 3
rd person (see Anagnostopoulou 2003: 270-271 who 
discusses evidence for this based on the serialization of agreement markers in 
Georgian). In contrast, accusative-nominative/ direct object 3
rd person 
pronouns behave as if they lack person features altogether. Adger and Harbour 
(2003) propose to express this distinction as follows. They argue that 3
rd person 
indirect objects have a negative person specification (i.e. they are [-person]) 
while 3
rd person direct objects lack a person feature entirely. On this view, 
there are two ways in which an argument can be 3
rd person: either by being [-
person] or by lacking a person feature. Indirect objects in PCC environments 
must have a +/- person value since they encode point of view, affectedness etc. 
On the other hand, direct objects are undergoers and therefore they do not have 
to have a participant value (they have one only when they are 1
st or 2
nd person). 
Suppose we adopt this view for subjects and objects Passamaquoddy. We can 
then propose that in this language, the feature PROX is assigned to NPs that 
are either [+Person] or [-Person], but not to NPs that lack a person feature 
entirely. 1
st and 2
nd person pronouns are necessarily [+Person]. Inanimate NPs 
lack [Person] features as they cannot encode point of view, affectedness etc, 
and can therefore never bear PROX. Animate 3
rd person NPs, though, can, in 
principle, have a specification for person. When they are contextually salient 
(topic-like) they are assigned the feature [-Person], i.e. they have a feature 
specification similar to 3
rd person indirect objects. When they are not salient 
they lack a person/ participant feature, being similar to 3
rd person accusative/ 
nominative/ absolutive arguments. When 3
rd person animates are assigned the 
feature [-Person/ Participant] they surface with unmarked proximate 
morphology, and the prefix on the verb agrees with them. When they lack the 
participant feature they have marked obviative morphology and are coindexed 
with the verb’s final suffix. The [-Person] specification is assigned in 
opposition to another third person which lacks the [Person] feature.  
In this analysis, the feature specification of NPs in languages with 
inverse systems is no different than the feature specification of NPs in other 
languages. What is special about inverse languages is that animate 3
rd person
NPs must be assigned a feature [-Person] in opposition to another 3
rd person 21
NP. Obligatory assignment of a [-Person] feature to one third person animate 
NP in a transitive clause lacking another 1
st or 2
nd person argument is linked to 
the requirement of T in the transitive clause to check a Person feature. Another 
crucial property of languages with inverse systems is that only T hosts person 
features that can be checked against NPs. That is, a [+/-Person] object cannot 
check its person feature against v-Tr, and must enter an Agree relation with T. 
Finally, the fact that 1,2>3 combinations are licit and 3>1,2 combinations are 
illicit in this language is reduced to the following factor. As has been seen 
above, arguments inherently specified as [+Person] must always enter Agree 
with T. In contrast, 3
rd person animate arguments are assigned the feature [-
Person] only in opposition to another third person argument as a Last-Resort: 
when there is no other way to satisfy properties of T. Therefore, 1
st and 2
nd
person arguments always move to T preventing 3
rd person arguments from 
doing so. 
5. Conclusions 
In this paper we examined ergative splits conditioned by person, which we 
compared to hierarchical effects in direct-inverse alternations. On the basis of 
two case studies (Lummi instantiating an ergative split person language and 
Passamaquoddy an inverse language) we proposed that the two language types 
differ as far as the location of person features is concerned. In inverse systems 
person features are located exclusively in T, while in ergative systems, they are 
located in T and a particular type of v. 
  Naturally, our treatment of such splits raises a number of questions, e.g. 
the treatment of tense splits in ergative languages and of animacy splits in 
languages such as Spanish. We leave these questions for further research. 
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